A note on coupled lotteries  by Adam, Marc T.P. et al.
Economics Letters 124 (2014) 96–99Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Economics Letters
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
A note on coupled lotteries
Marc T.P. Adam a,∗, Eike B. Kroll b, Timm Teubner a
a Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany
b buw consulting GmbH, Germany
h i g h l i g h t s
• Experimental analysis of individual, symmetric and asymmetric lotteries.
• When payoffs are symmetrically coupled, subjects make more risky choices.
• When payoffs are asymmetrically coupled, subjects make less risky choices.
• Subjects with persistent choices behave more risk averse.
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a b s t r a c t
We study the impact of coupling a decision maker’s lottery payoffs to those of a peer on the preferred
level of risk by means of a lab experiment. Compared to the benchmark where the lotteries are
paid off individually, symmetrically coupled payoffs increase the willingness to take risks, whereas
asymmetrically coupled payoffs have the opposite effect. Moreover, subjects with persistent choices in
the different conditions behave more risk averse than subjects with non-persistent behavior.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
The literature on other-regarding preferences mostly abstracts
from uncertainty and focuses on deterministic scenarios; ‘‘few
contributions investigate risk taking in a social context’’ (Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2010, p. 628). However, recent theoretical and
experimental work is increasingly concerned with the interplay of
both aspects (see Trautmann, 2009; Trautmann and Vieider, 2011;
Gantner and Kerschbamer, 2011). Trautmann and Vieider (2011)
found that fairness motives and uncertainty interact if (a) the
decision maker observes the payoff of other agents they consider
relevant, (b) the outcome of another person serves as a reference
point, and (c) people aim for conformitywith their peers’ behavior.
Therefore, creating a social context in risky choice situations is
likely to affect decisions. This holds even when subjects only
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0/).affect their own payoffs or chances without any impact on others’
payoffs. Weigold and Schlenker (1991) found that especially risk
averse subjects are affected when their choices are observed by
a passive partner and reduce their risk tolerance. In contrast,
originally risk seeking subjects showed higher risk tolerance.
The question how peer presence affects risk tolerance is
important since many decisions take place within a social
context (e.g., management decisions, social trading, and gamified
applications). Various experiments analyzed choices where risk is
introduced to a social context, e.g., probabilistic dictator games
where not the payoff is distributed but the probabilistic chance
of winning the complete amount (Karni et al., 2008; Krawczyk
and Le Lec, 2010; Brock et al., 2013) or where uncertainty about
the pie size is introduced (Haisley and Weber, 2010; Ockenfels
and Werner, 2012). Brennan et al. (2008) and Güth et al. (2008)
analyzed subjects’ willingness to pay and accept for prospects with
different combinations of payoffs to oneself and a peer. Other
scholars focused on situationswith decisions explicitly on behalf of
a peer (Chakravarty et al., 2011; Pahlke et al., 2010; Charness and
Jackson, 2009), or where a deliberate departure from one’s own
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.
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All of these studies analyzed choice situations where at least one
of the subjects directly affected the other’s payoff.
Other studies, similar to ours, created the social context by
the existence of a passive partner. Linde and Sonnemans (2012),
found that participants exhibited higher risk aversion when they
could earn at most as much as a passive partner (who received
a fixed payoff), compared to when they were ensured to earn
at least as much. The passive partner seemed to create a social
reference point. Prospect Theory, however, does not predict this
behavior. Cooper and Rege (2011) considered the impact of peer
group choices and concluded that ‘‘social interaction effects driven
by social regret can cause peer group effects’’ (p. 109), meaning
that an observed choice increases the decisionmaker’s tendency to
choose the observed level of risk aswell. Gantner and Kerschbamer
(2011) complemented this finding in an experiment in which
they explicitly abstracted from material externalities, information
on outcomes, and stochastic dependence. They found that being
exposed to the decisions of a fictitious peer in risky choices, the
decision maker’s level of risk shifts towards that of the peer.
Bault et al. (2008) matched participants with fictitious peers
and analyzed the impact of lottery outcomes on arousal. They
found that contrary outcomes (one loses, the other wins) caused
stronger physiological reactions than when participants win or
lose concurrently.
While most prior studies confronted subjects with risky
decisions in light of a peer’s outcome or choice (ex-post), there
exist few insights about the impact of how chances and payoffs
are coupled from an ex-ante perspective, i.e. before the decision
maker knows anything about the other’s actions or results, except
that there is another player. In our paper, we address such ex-ante
decisions and systematically vary the social context by altering the
way in which the participants’ outcomes are coupled.
2. Experimental design
Every participant successively faced 3 risk preference elicitation
tasks, similar to Holt and Laury (2002), using a within-subject
design with varying sequence. The 3 tasks each consisted of 21
choices between 2 alternative lotteries A and B. Every lottery had
a high (A: e 20, B: e 15) and a low payoff (A: e 0, B: e 5).
The choice set is represented in Table 1. The experiment was
conducted using pen and paper at the Institute of Information
Systems and Marketing at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in
Karlsruhe, Germany. Altogether, 140 subjects were recruited using
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Subjects were seated in separated cabins,
communication was not allowed. They did not see each other prior
or during the experiment.
To investigate the influence of the social context, we manipu-
lated the way the subjects’ payoff is linked to that of a partner. The
social context was established by the payoff procedure. Depend-
ing on the treatment, subjects were called for payoff individually,
or in pairs of two. In the latter case, they could observe their (ran-
domly assigned) partner’s decisions and result. At the time of de-
cision making, participants did not know or get to see the partner.
First, in the control treatment, lotteries were not coupled
but realized for each subject individually (IND). Second, in the
symmetric treatment (SYM), lotteries were symmetrically coupled,
i.e., either both subjects received the low or the high payoff of
their respective lottery choice. Third, in the asymmetric treatment
(ASYM), lotteries were asymmetrically coupled, i.e., one subject
received the high payoff (e 20 ore 15) while the partner inevitably
received the low payoff (e 0 or e 5). Note that the difference
between the players’ payoffs in the SYM treatment can at most be
e 5 (i.e. e 0 or e 5), whereas it is at least e 10 (i.e. e 10, e 15, or
e 20) in the ASYM treatment for any combination of choices.Whilethese ‘‘guaranteed’’ differences were deliberately not highlighted
in the instructions, they were implicitly available to subjects by
comparing the payoffs on the decision sheet. Neither partner’s
identity nor choice was known at the time of decision making.
Finally, a dice roll determined the relevant choice set for
all participants of a particular session. Then, subjects either
individually (IND) or in random groups of two (SYM, ASYM) were
called to the experimenter. First, one of the 21 rows was selected
with equal probabilities. Then an urn was equipped with 20 balls
of 2 colors where the proportions of the colors reflected the
probabilities. Then the lottery was played out for one (IND), or for
the 2 subjects of the current group with a single draw from the
urn (SYM, ASYM). In the SYM treatment, the high payoffs were
associated with one, and the low payoffs with the other color.
The ASYM treatment realized asymmetrical coupling by one color
identifying thehighpayoff for one subject and the low for the other.
3. Results
Expectedly, subjects behave risk averse on average (#scoverall =
14.567 > 11 = #scrisk neutral). Altogether, 35 subjects (25%) chose
the same number of safe choices in all 3 treatments. We refer to
this behavior as persistent. In contrast, 105 subjects (75%) deviated
at least once (SYMand/or ASYM) from thenumber of safe choices in
the IND condition. We refer to this behavior as non-persistent. The
comparison of persistent and non-persistent subjects reveals that
persistent subjects (N = 35,M = 15.486, SD = 2.994)mademore
safe choices than non-persistent subjects (N = 105, M = 14.260,
SD = 2.883) (two-tailed independent samples Wilcoxon test:
Z = −2.445, p = 0.015).
Result 1. Subjects with persistent choices reveal a higher degree of
risk aversion than subjects with non-persistent behavior.
The majority made varying numbers of safe choices across
treatments. A Friedman test reveals that these treatment differ-
ences are systematic (χ2 = 15.961, p < 0.001, average ranks
arsym = 1.73, arind = 2.04, arasym = 2.23). We now focus on
these non-persistent subjects. The analysis shows that subjects
made a lower number of safe choices in the SYM condition than
in the IND condition (two-tailed paired samples Wilcoxon test,
Z = −2.554, p = 0.011).
Result 2a. Subjects make riskier choices when the payoffs are
symmetrically coupled, compared to the benchmark treatment with
individual payoffs.
The number of safe choices in the SYM condition is also smaller
than in the ASYM condition (Z = −3.435, p < 0.001). The number
of safe choices in the baseline condition IND lies in the middle
of SYM and ASYM. It is smaller than in the ASYM condition, this
difference, however, is only marginally significant (Z = −1.736,
p = 0.083).
Result 2b. Subjects make less risky choices when the payoffs are
asymmetrically coupled, compared to the benchmark treatment with
individual payoffs.
We believe that the difference in risk tolerance between
persistent and non-persistent subjects (Result 1) substantiates
the need for a broken down analysis. Note, however, that
Result 2a and Result 2b are robust towards including the persistent
subjects (SYM vs. IND: Z = −2.666, p = 0.008 ; SYM vs. ASYM:
Z = −3.488, p < 0.001; IND vs. ASYM: Z = −1.757, p = 0.079).
Similar to above, the difference between IND and ASYM is only
marginally significant.
Overall, as can be seen in Fig. 1, the number of safe choices
follows the distinct pattern SYM < IND < ASYM (MSYM = 13.762,
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Lottery probability and payoff structure.
Row P(high payoff) P(low payoff) Set of lotteries
Option A Option B
High payoff Low payoff High payoff Low payoff
1 100% 0% 20 e 0 e 15 e 5 e
2 95% 5% 20 e 0 e 15 e 5 e
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
i (21− i)× 5% (i− 1)× 5% 20 e 0 e 15 e 5 e
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
20 5% 95% 20 e 0 e 15 e 5 e
21 0% 100% 20 e 0 e 15 e 5 e17.0
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Fig. 1. Average number of safe choices, depending on behavior and treatment. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.SDSYM = 3.274, MIND = 14.229, SDIND = 2.923, MASYM = 14.790,
SDASYM = 3.591). In 98% of the cases, the choice patterns show
only one switching point between lottery A and B. Furthermore,
we control for sequence effects. If the IND task is performed before
the SYM and ASYM tasks, the number of safe choices in the ASYM
task is slightly smaller than when IND is performed after SYM and
ASYM (Spearman’s ρ = −0.170, p = 0.044, n = 140).
4. Discussion
Our study shows that subjects systematically deviate from their
inherent individual risk preference, even when neither knowing
the peer’s payoff nor her choice, and the lotteries’ payoffs are
coupled. Therefore, we extend the existing literature by a novel
aspect. Specifically we show that symmetrically coupled payoffs
lead to higher, whereas asymmetrically coupled payoffs lead
to lower degrees of risk tolerance, compared to the non-social
benchmark. There is reason to believe, however, that the decision
maker’s inherent risk preference does not actually change, but that
it rather interacts with social motives.
We argue that, on the one hand, anticipated social regret,
i.e., the fear of ending up in a comparatively disadvantageous
situation, can explain the increase in risk aversion. On the other
hand, the ‘‘guaranteed’’ difference of at most e 5, i.e. winning
or losing together, may reduce these obstructive influences of
social comparison. This, in contrast, causes a shift towards risk
propensity. Recall that the risk-neutral number of safe choices
is 11, which is even lower. Inequality aversion may also (partly)
rationalize our findings. While the effect in the SYM treatment
remains indefinite, inequality averse subjects may prefer the low-
risk lottery in the ASYM treatment, since it yields strictly lower
differences, regardless of the other player’s choice.
The differences regarding stated risk attitude across treatments
also hold when including participants with identical statements
in all 3 treatments. The differentiation seems justified, since thisparticular group is associated with a distinctly higher degree of
risk aversion, which appears quite intriguing. Stating identical
risk preferences across all 3 situations may be regarded a sign of
rejection of social motives, deliberately or subconsciously. Such
‘‘persistent’’ behavior (in the sense of social unaffectedness) is
then, however, further away from risk-neutrality than the affected
participants’ behavior.
At the time of decision making, subjects did not know which
of the 3 treatment alternatives would actually be realized. They
had to anticipate the situation andwere not actually facing it when
deciding. Therefore, our resultsmay even underestimate the actual
impact of the social context. Although, of course, our studymust be
seen in a wider context of results and the specific characteristics
of the experiment, it may be relevant from an ‘‘engineering’’
perspective. The Dutch postcode lottery (e.g., Zeelenberg and
Pieters, 2004), for instance, uses the socially reinforced thought of
regret in a straightforwardly appliedway. The important extension
of deciding on how to couple the payoffs among oneself and the
peer –we deliberately abstracted from this aspect – is left to future
research. We argue that particularly in situations with ex ante
considerations regarding the resulting payoff constellations, the
role of the peer may be essential for decision making under risk.
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